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CHAPTER I
IHTRODUGTIOII
The primary objectives of this study are to identify and de
scribe the major factors that have led to the present structure of labormanagament relations and union organization and procedures and to pro
pose solutions to some of the problems that have developed.

Specific

emphasis has been placed on union security agreements and contract
ratification by the workers.
The volume of materials written on the subjects of labor.management relations, labor legislation, and union structure and organi
zation is enormous.

The authors of these works range from relatively

unbiased members of the academic community to corporation executives and
labor union leaders.

On the more specific subjects of union security

agreements and the process of acceptance of collective bargaining agree
ments, which was the central concern of this paper, many articles and
portions of books have been written.

These have ranged from impassioned

appeals to the emotions on the one hand to logical, factually-based
rhetoric on the other.

The former are important not because pf their

intellectual content but because they do profoundly influence the beliefs
and actions of millions of Americans.

The latter are important because

they must be understood by anyone doing work in the field, for they are
the basis of any analysis to be undertaken.

Although the separate sub

jects have already been thoroughly covered by other writers, none of
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those works readily available has attempted to relate union security
agreements, or the lack thereof, with the acceptance or rejection of
agreements negotiated under collective bargaining procedures.
Starting during the New Deal when they were first recognized and
protected by the federal government, American unions grew rapidly during
the period immediately after World >Var II,
the major forces acting upon the economy.
States has been faced with inflation.

Today they represent one of
For several years the United

One of the contributing factors

has been the rising costs which confront firms in many industries.

A

principal cause of the rising costs for the majority of firms is in
creased labor costs.

Throughout the economy, the larger firms in every

industry set the example for their competitors, and their sheer size
gives them an aggregate influence which permeates every facet of the
economy.

The rates they set tend to be followed by other firms.

These

larger firms are also the ones which are the most likely to be unionized.
Thus, it can be seen that the unions which are asking for and receiving
increased compensation for the workers whom they represent are making an
indelible mark on the economy of the United States.

The subjects of

acceptance of collective bargaining agreements and a secure union and
their interrelationship are of great importance to unions; therefore,
they represent worthwhile subjects for investigation by anyone studying
the field of business administration.
Job security is important to everyone who works for a living.
The insecure worker will be less effective than the secure worker be
cause the former will be spending part of his efforts protecting his job
while the latter can devote all of his energy to job accomplishment.
Union security in the sense of the union’s being secure is analogous to
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job security.

The union which is insecure will divert some of the effort

of its officers away from promoting the best interests of its members
and to protecting the union from attack.

The attack against the union

may come from such diverse directions as an employer who has not yet
accepted the idea of a unionized work force, the right-to-work laws
that some states have enacted, and raids by rival unions.
Collective bargaining is the discussion of the conditions of
employment among representatives of union and management.

The nego

tiation will hopefully lead to an agreement which both labor and manage
ment will find satisfactory or at least acceptable.

The management

representatives almost always have the power to bind the comptany to the
agreement reached.

The union representatives, on the contrary, normally

do not have the power to bind the workers.

This uneven situation is a

source of disharmony in labor-management relations.
In this paper both of these phenomena have been examined sep
arately, their relationship to one another analyzed, and solutions pro
posed to the joint problem of union insecurity and ratification of
collective bargaining agreements.

The major thesis of this paper is

that if workers are no longer given the opportunity to ratify collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by their union representatives but are
bound by the conditions of employment mutually agreed upon by union and
management, strikes over failure to ratify such agreements will be cur
tailed and labor-management relations will be enhanced.
will lead to a second equally important benefit.

This, in turn,

If the worker knows

that he will be bound by the agreement negotiated by the union repre
sentatives and management, just as citizens are bound by the collective
judgment of the legislature, he will want to choose a representative
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whose views agree with his ovm.

To do this the worker will want to be

long to the union which has exclusive bargaining rights, notwithstanding
any lack of an agreement requiring union membership.

Thus, with the

union no longer having to justify its existence to the workers, the
union officials will be able to represent more forcefully the legitimate
Interests of the employees; such as, increased benefits and pay

and to

assist the management in increasing industrial efficiency.
Labor Legislation
. The most important labor legislation of the federal government is
contained in four acts of Congress.
Deal or are more recent.

All of these acts date from the New

The first of these is the Norris-LaGuardia Act

of 1932 which deals with the use of injunctions in labor disputes.

The

primary purpose of this act was to prevent the indiscriminate use of a
court injunction by a judge at the request of management to prevent or
end a strike by the workers.

This legislation dates back to the period

when unions and the workers they represent were still struggling for re
cognition from the employers.
The second major pièce of legislation is the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, called the Wagner Act.

This law obliged

...an employer to bargain with a union designated as exclusive
representative of the employees in a given unit. The unit was to
be defined by the NLRB, and the selection of representative was to
be accomplished by a majority decision of the interested employees.^
The main reason for this act was to require the management to recognize
for bargaining purposes the collective action of their employees expressed
^Neil W. Chamberlain, The Labor Sector
Book Companym 1965), p. 282.

(New York;

McGraw-Hill
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through the union.
The third important federal labor law is the Labor Management
Relations Act of 19ii7, called the Taft-Hartley Act.

This far-reaching

piece of post-war legislation was intended to curb several different
types of abuses being committed by both labor and management.

The Taft-

Hartley Act established methods for securing union recognition and
preventing "unfair labor practices" by management and unions.

The Act

outlines the areas to be covered by collective bargaining.
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
employees in such a unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment.2
The vague clause mentioning other conditions of employment continues to
be subject of controversy between management and labor.

Generally, the

disagreements center around whether a given subject is an "other condi
tion of employment" or whether it is a management prerogative into which
the union should not intrude.

Not only does this section contain this

problem, but it is equally vague in mentioning "a unit appropriate for
such purposes."

This particular phrase has been subject of three-

cornered arguing among management, the craft unions, and the industrial
unions, as well as bickering within each group.

Section 9 (a), however,

is emphatic in the assertion that the union shall be the exclusive repre
sentative of all employees, whether or not they are members thereof.
The fact of exclusive representation makes the question of who is to be
the representative a critical one.

In addition to this important section.

^li.S., Labor Management Relations Act of 19U7, Section 9 (a).
The Practice of Collective Bargaining, Edwin F. Beal and Edward D. dickersham (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Incorporated, 1967), p. 10$.
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the Taft-Hartley Act has an even more controversial section.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed
or application of agreements requiring
zation as a condition of employment in
which such execution or application is
ritorial Law.^

as authorizing the execution
membership in a labor organi
any State or Territory in
prohibited by State or Ter

Section lU (b) is the well known part of the Taft-Hartley Act which
supports the existence of the so-called "right-to-viork" laws.

From a

purely political viewpoint, this section is noteworthy because it is one
of the few pieces of federal legislation which allows state law to super
cede federal law.

From a pragmatic standpoint, this sections prevents

union membership from being a condition of employment where state law
prohibits it.

Sometime during each session of Congress there is a con

certed drive by the lobby of organized labor to have Section li; (b) re
pealed.

As yet, these efforts have fallen short.

Each Congressional

election, however, various politicians make the platform promise to
attempt to get Section lli (b) repealed.
The most recent of the four major pieces of federal labor legis
lation is the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.

This act regulates the in

ternal affairs of both unions and managements.

The purpose is to prevent

abuses by having full disclosure of actions.
These four acts of Cor^ress are important because the breadth of
their coverage gives them a strong influence over every aspect of labormanagement relations.

A basic grasp of their meaning and impact is

essential to the study of labor-management relations.
^.S., Labor Management Relations Act of 19U7, Section lù (b),
Beal and Wickersham, o£. cit., p. 106.
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Union Acceptance
Notwithstanding the notoriety of some of the major labor unions,
particularly the Teamsters and the various railway operating unions,
with the accomparçring unfavorable publicity given by the mass media,
unions are, nonetheless, acceptable to the jeople of the United States,
"...a clear majority of every major group approves the existence of
unions — whether the group is defined by region, occupation, age, in
come, or political p a r t y . T h e fact that people, as a whole, believe
that unions should be allowed to exist, however, implies no more than
that they believe unions are a permanent part of the economy of this
country.

There are groups, in fact, who, although they accept labor

organizations and the role they play, do not feel that union membership
is desirable for them.
The identification of white-collar workers with management, the
large portion of women employees among the clerical work force, the
low prestige of unionism, and the enlightened personnel policies of
most corporate management are among the main reasons that the chances
of changing the present organizational patterns radically are rather
slim.2
Even though union membership may not be appropriate for everyone, the
widespread acceptance of unions throughout our society means that they
have a firm, secure foundation in American business.
Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is the process whereby representatives of

^erek Curtis Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the American
Community (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 12,
r"
'^Julius Rezler, Automation and Industrial Labor (New York;
Random House, 1969), pp. 12U-25.
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management and labor jointly discuss the problems and issues that are of
mutual concern.

The process includes the rather formalized negotiation

of the labor-management contract containing the conditions of employment
as prescribed in the Taft-Hartley Act.

It also includes the less for

malized discussions of the interpretation of the signed contract and of
the grievances which may arise from time to time.

Collective bargaining

is the heart of the relationship between labor and management because
that relationship is based on the ground rules laid down in the collec
tive bargaining agreement.

The process of collective bargaining is an

intricate one.
Collective bargaining may be viewed from many angles.
The marketing concept looks upon collective bargaining as a means of
contracting for the sale of labor. It is an exchange relationship.
The governmental concept views collective bargaining as a consti
tutional system in industry. It is a political relationship. The
industrial relations concept views collective bargaining as a system
of industrial grievance. It is a functional relationship
On a broader scale it is the system whereby the terms under which labor
will continue to be supplied to a company by its present employees or
Tfill be supplied in the future by newly hired workers is determined.
Notwithstanding the viewpoint taken, collective bargaining is crucial;

for it establishes the basic relationship between employer and employee.
The process of collective bargaining begins long before the
teams of negotiators sit down on opposite sides of the bargaining table.
"Preparation for negotiation involves:
ulating what the members want;

(1) drawing up demands, or form

(2) assembling information to support the

demands; and (3) publicizing and explaining the demands."?

The process

^Chamberlain, op. cit., pp. 136-37.
?Beal and Wickersham, o£, cit., p. 167.
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involves an ordering of priorities by both sides and playing one demand
against another until a satisfactory agreement can be reached.

Each

negotiating team must be conscious both of what his side wants, inclu
ding minimum acceptable and maximum allowable positions, but also of the
corresponding positions of the opposition.

Bargaining involves a thor

ough knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of both sides as well as
an understanding of the psychology of the give and take of negotiation.
The aspirations of the member must be adjusted by union negotiators
to accomodate a) the conflicting desires of different groups of mem
bers, b) the longer-run interests of the members, as the leaders
perceive them, c) the survival and growth of the union as an organi
zation, d) the demands and interests of management, and e) the re
action of the community at large and its impact on the interests of
the union and its members."
If the local negotiator, who is normally an elected official,
...realizes that it would be wise for him to give ground on certain
union demands but finds it difficult to do so without loss of pres
tige he might have the national office advise him to yield, pro
viding him with the 'out' that ^ would have stood firm, but the
national office overruled him. In other cases the local officers
may be in a position to demand and secure fuller support from their
national officers, even though the latter disapprove of the cause.5*
(Italics in the original)
The union representative is forced to reconcile the extreme demand of
the workers whom he represents which have little likelihood of management
acceptance with a less extreme position which is not popular with the
workers but has a better chance of approval by management.

In an attempt

to ease the load on the union negotiator, many national and international
unions require local unions to submit local agreements to them for ap
proval.

Again there is the chance for the headquarters to determine

local policy by refusing to sanction what has been locally agreed to.
®Bok and Dunlop, o£, cit., p. 77.
^Chamberlain, op. cit., pp. 196-97.
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Another procedure commonly used in collective bargaining is for
the union negotiators to submit the agreement which they negotiated vri.th
management to their own members for ratification.
followed in the majority of cases.

This procedure is

The literature

on this subject, how

ever, fails to reveal which specific

unions do

not

have ratification

procedures.

On a much less frequent

basis the

management negotiatormay

submit his agreement to the board of

directors

for

ratification.

effective collective bargaining must create some sort of procedure that
id.ll enable agreements to be reached without unnecessary economic con
flict and without ruining the relations between the parties.

It must be

economically realistic both from view of the parties and society.

The

problem is reconciling the need for achieving acceptable agreements with
the need for reaching economically viable agreements without undue dis
ruptions.

Ratification causes disruptions in the bargaining process

when rejection occurs.

It has been said that "...the use of ratification

votes as a bargaining technique can disrupt and distort the whole bar
gaining process.

The dangers thus created may be more pervasive than

the danger that union members will repudiate an agreement that their
leaders have made in good f a i t h . I n s t e a d of having union members
ratify the negotiated collective bargaining agreement, it is possible
for the union negotiators to be empowered to agree to a final contract
id.th management.

Some unions, on the other hand, have a preliminary

advisory vote on the offer of management.

Rejection does not mean a

strike but is only an indication that they want more.

Such a practice

^^Glyde W. Summers, "Ratification of Agreements," Frontiers of
Collective Bargaining, ed. John T. Dunlop and Neil W. Chamberlain (New
York; Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 79.
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is really only a part of the bargaining process.
not really even support the proposals.

The negotiators may

The danger to collective bar

gaining caused by the tendency of some union members to reject agreements
proposed

their leaders "has generated demands for reconsideration of

the role of ratification and a re-examination of the problems it poses
in our evolving system of collective bargaining.Contract ratifi
cation is discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.

In addition

to being used for contract negotiation, collective bargaining is also
employed to solve disputes arising out of an existing contract.

The

union has to control the grievance process in order to carry out its
necessary role of reconciling the conflicting interests of diverse
groups to produce the greatest benefit for the unit as a whole.
Collective bargaining has been called "a relationship between
organizations," a "power relationship between organizations," a "treatymaking and treaty-enforcing process between companies and unions," and
"a process of accommodation between companies and un i o n s . C ol le ct ive
bargaining is all of these things.
Bargaining Power and Strikes
The bargaining power of companies and unions may vary greatly.
It is proportional to their size and economic strength.

Although these

may be measured on an absolute basis, they have more meaning on a rela
tive basis.

On one hand there are giant unions such as the Teamsters

^Ibid., p. 77.
^%rederick H. Harbison, "Collective Bargaining and American
Capitalism," Industrial Conflict, ed. Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin,
and Arthur K. Ross (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 195U), pp.
270-71.
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and the Building Trades Unions who deal with small, fragmented trucking
and construction firms, respectively.

On the other hand, there might be

a large firm whose employees are represented by many small, separate
unions.
...the union may increase its bargaining power either by increasing
the cost to management of disagreeing on the union’s terms or by
reducing the cost to management of agreeing on the union's terms....
A union or management may not always be able to alter one of these
determinants of its bargaining power independently of any effect on
the other determinants,
What the union is trying to do is to make it cheaper for the company to
agree to its terms than to reject them.

Conversely, the firm tries to

make it more profitable for the union to accept its offer than to reject
it.

Bargaining power consists of proposals that are economically sound

and backed by the economic strength to carry them out.

It has been

noted, for example, that as automation decreases the size of bargaining
units, their economic strength decreases.

"Coalition bargaining is an

attempt by a group of local and international unions, usually in an in
dustrial setting to bargain with a multiplant, multiunion employer on a
joint basis for all the employees represented by those unions."^

The

purpose, obviously, is to give the unions involved in coalition bar
gaining a greater relative strength vis-a-vis the large employer.

Col

lective bargaining is becomming more and more centralized in many in
dustries.
In many instances, the union can increase its bargaining power by ne
gotiating for a larger group of employees.... As union members be
come aware of conditions in other plants, they are likely to protest
if they receive lower wages and benefits than members doing similar
^Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 187.
•^^illiarn H. Chernish, Coalition Bargaining; a Study of Union
Tactics and Public Policy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1969), p. 5.
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work elsewhere,... Centralized negotiations can offer a variety of
administrative advantages,.,. Even if a union vrishes to maintain
local autonomy^ it may encounter heavy pressure from employers to
move toward more centralized b a r g a i n i n g . ^5
The firm, as well as the union, tries to take those actions which viill
favorably change the relative bargaining power of management and labor.
If negotiations fail, the resulting lockout or strike is really merely
an extension of the bargaining power of the two parties.

Just as was it

an extension of politics by other means, so too is a strike or lockout
an extension of industrial bargaining.
tool to be used by the parties involved.

The strike or lockout is another
If they are unable to achieve

their aims through negotiations, they may use these devices to achieve
them if they feel that their goals may be more readily attained through
these means.

If a strike or lockout does result from negotiations, the

economic consequences are significant.

Strikes and lockouts cause re

duced sales for the firm and reduced paychecks for the employees.

The

present times are, however, not as fraught with industrial strife as
previously.

With 19U6 as an all time high in lost time due to strikes,

the number of man-days idle due to strikes fell rapidly from 19b$-$3 but
more slowly from 195It-63.

The average number of man-days idle per

striker fell from 19U5-53 but rose from 19SL-63.

The number of work

stoppages rose from 19U5-53 and fell from 195it-63.

The man-days idle as

a percent of estimated working time fell rapidly from 19h$-^3 but more
slowly from 195U-63.

The number of workers involved in work stoppages

fell steadily from 19LS-63.^^

There is no clear agreement on the reason

^^Bok and Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 108-10.
^%Cobert Dubin, "Industrial Conflict; The Power of Prediction,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XVIII, no. 3 (April, 1965), p p .
352-63.
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for these changes.

Perhaps one of the most easily accepted explanations

is that unions are no longer battling the employers for recognition.

As

a result, unions and the workers they represent may be less militant and
less strike-prone.

In spite of the improving climate for labor-manage

ment relations, the collective bargaining process does have its problems.
One such subject of frequent dispute is the inclusion or omission of
some sort of union security provision in the collective bargsdning
agreement.
Definitions of lÿpes of Shops
The high degree of interest over union security agreements
arises because, as stated above, the Taft-Hartley Act gives the repre
sentatives of workers exclusive bargaining rights for all the workers in
the shop.

This exclusive representation is of vital concern to the

worker, the employer, and the union.

A union security provision of a

collective bargaining agreement is a clause which requires employees to
become members of a union or assume some financial obligation to the
union.

There are five principal types of shop agreements.

In order of

increasing demands on the worker, the first is the exclusive bargaining
shop in which "there is no requirement of union membership nor must the
employees be hired through the union.

This weakest form of union secu

rity just guarantees the union recognition as the exclusive bargaining
agent."17

Second, a maintenance-of-membership provision requires pres

ent members to maintain their membership status but does not require
l^Kax Sidones Wortman and George G. Witteried, (eds.). Labor
Relations and Collective Bargaining; Text and Cases . (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1969), p. 2Î?3.
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other employees to join.

Third, an agency shop does not require mem

bership but only the payment of periodic dues and assessments.

Fourth,

the union shop requires union membership as a condition of continued
employment after a specified number of days employment have elapsed.
The Taft-Hartley Act further provides that no employer shall discrim
inate against any employee for nonmember ship in the union if membership
was denied or terminated for reasons other than the payment of normal
periodic dues and initiation fees.

Lastly, the closed shop makes mem

bership in the union mandatory before an employer can hire a worker.
The closed shop has been illegal since the Taft-Hartley Act was passed.
The exclusive bargaining shop is really no more than including
in the collective bargaining agreement that which is already guaranteed
by law.

The maintenance-of-membership agreement and the agency shop are

not common, nor are they particularly controversial.

Although the

closed shop is unofficially allowed to exist in certain places, its
prohibition prevents it from becoming an important problem for either
management or labor.

The union shop, on the contrary, is highly contro

versial and emotionally charged.

The arguments for and against the

union shop are discussed in the next chapter.
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GRAFTER II
A SECURE UNION

The controversy over union security agreements in collective
bargaining contracts is basically one over how secure is the union
going to be in its position as exclusive collective bargaining agent
for the workers in the firm.

The presence of a union security agreement

in the labor-management contract is the final overt step in securing the
union's position.

On a more basic level the secured position depends

upon the organisation of the union and its membership.

These two vari

ables, in turn, determine the likelihood that a union security agreement
can be inserted into the contract between the union and the firm.
Union Organization

The organization of unions varies with time, space, and by the
industry whose workers they represent.

Notwithstanding the variations

which exist in union organization, the theoretical model is a democratic
one.
The union has traditionally conceived of itself not as an entity
separate from its members but as a collectivity of its members.
Union government is built on the democratic model, and the union
asserts its claim to participate in determining terms and conditions
of employment as the spokesman for employees. The statutory role of
majority rule reflects the union's conception of itself as represen
tative of the employees charged with expressing their desires.

1A
Summers, loc. cit., p. 83.
16
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Inasmuch as the democratic tradition is deep-rooted in our political in
stitutions, it is easily understandable that it would likewise be firmly
based in our social institutions.

Unions

...are, indeed, 'little republics' within the workplace. Unions see
themselves as governments over working conditions; they like to refer
to their conventions as parliamentary assemblies; they conceive their
elections to be a replica of local and national elections; they look
upon their walking delegates and business agents as a police force,
upon their grievance committee as courts, upon their strikes as wars
and their settlements as peace treaties. They also see their dues
as proper taxes, their control of the market as a form of tariff
against dangerous foreign import, their examination of membership
aspirants as citizenship tests, their union and closed shop clauses
as a version of the 'republic's' prerogative to impose a burden on
those who would enjoy the blessings of society.
Union officials consider the analogy perfect between the union as the
government of the workers in their place of work and the political system.
"There is no better evidence that a union is a 'little nation' than the
jurisdictional war between two unions.
battle over a handful of jobs."20

Tvro unions will engage in bloody

The determination of union jurisdic

tion by election of the workers has led to contests between unions to
represent the same groups of workers.

Another concern in union organi

zation is the division of power between the national or international
union and the local union.
This division of power is mainly seen as a gradation of central
ization from rigidly centralized on the one hand to completely autonomous
on the other.

Union organization is most centralized in industries where

competition is national, and bargaining is national.

In industries where

the market is local (building construction, newspaper printing, and local

Gus Tyler, The Political Imperative; the Corporate Character
of Unions. Introduction by F.S.C. NorthTup. (hew tork; Macmillan arid
Gomnany, 1968), p. 86.
2Qlbid., pp. 19i).-95.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
trucking), the local union is independent.^^
While some officials seek more concentrated power, a few would give
more power to the locals believing that it is best that the workers
handle their ovm problems. Others are not as convinced that the
workers know necessarily what is best. They call for less respon
siveness to the membership. Instead, they want labor's executives
to take the lead and be instead responsible to their m e m b e r s . ^2
The ones who are sceptical of the worker's knowledge of what is best are,
in effect, advocating a republican system of government rather than a
direct democracy.

The federal government, as well as all the state and

most of the local governments, are of the representative type.
limited number of the local governments are direct democracies.

Only a
Unions

are performing governmental functions in a specialised way and in spe
cialized areas improper or inconvenient for the government itself to
undertake.23 There is a divergence of opinion concerning whether these
functions will, in the future, tend more to be performed by the national
or the local union.

Some believe that national unions are less and less

able to control the behavior of their locals, caused by an increasing
divergence between the thinking of top union leadership and that of the
membership in the plant.Others feel that the loss of control is "as
a result of the changing composition of the riant work force... the local
membership is itself no longer as cohesive a group as it was a decade
ago, and divergent interests within the group cannot always be reconciled

i|th ed.

^^Lloyd George Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations.
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 196It), p. 86.

22solomon Barkin and Albert A. Blum, "What's To Be Done for
Labor? The Trade Unionist's Answer," Labor Law Journal, XV, no. 3
(196W, p. 79.
^^Tyier, op. crt., p. 92.
Z^Rezler, op. cit., p. 137.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
to the satisfaction of

Still others feel that increased central

ization will be the natural result of the evolving business conditions.
Industry-wide collective bargaining involving the big and decisive massproduction and distribution industries of the economy will change the
structure of both management and union.

The local union will eventually

yield its rights and powers in collective bargaining to the international,
which is a delegate organization away from local control.Only time
m i l tell in which direction union organization mil proceed.

The

agreements themselves involve varying degrees of involvement.

One study

found that two-thirds of all contracts cover employees in a single
factory, and about 8o percent of all agreements cover workers in a
single firm.

Although the proportion of agreements covering several

companies is therefore approximately 20 percent, multiemployer agree
ments cover at least one-third of all employees under collective bar
gaining agreements.27

The issue of the extent of coverage of collective

bargaining agreements is one aspect of centralization of union power and
organization.
Union Membership
The ultimate source of union strength lies in its membership.
The more members a union has, the more dues it will collect.

The more

dues collected, the more money the union will have available to use to
2%ichard A. Beaumont and Roy P. Helfgott, Management, Autoraation, and People (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 196U),

prm^

—

^^Beal and Wickersham, op, cit., p. 52.
27chamerlain, 0£. cit., pp. 2liO-Ui.
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undertake those actions which it considers beneficial to the membership.
Unions prefer dues checkoff because it both saves them effort in col
lection and further regulates and entrenches the union in the plant.
Management opposes checkoff because it is an expense for the union's
primaiy benefit.

Management's opposition to checkoff is really rather

short-sighted inasmuch as checkoff provides for smoother labor-management
relations by eliminating an important source of agitation at little cost
to management.
Union membership varies greatly by industry and ty occupation.
TABLE 1
UNION ORGANIZATION BY IKDUSTRY^^
Percent
Organized

Industry

Transportation, communications, and utilities
7U.7
Construction.......................
Manufacturing.......................
50.0
Mining
...........................
il7.2
Government...........................
lii.l
Services............................
10.5
T r a d e .............................
Finance and Real estate
............
2.0
Agriculture..............................
0.8

70.9

9.3

TABLE 2
UNION ORGANIZATION BY OCCUPATION^?

Occupation

Percent
Organized

Operators (semi-skilled) ...................
63
Craftsmen and foremen . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
Laborers (excluding agriculture) . . . . . . .
38
Clerical . . . . . ........................
26
Service...........................
20
Sales
.................
. . 5-10
Managers.........................
Professional and technical .................
5-10
28Bok and Dunlop, op. cit., p. 9h,

^^IMd., p. U5.
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Unions are stronger, obviously, in those industries and in those occu
pations in which a greater percentage of workers are union members.

On

an overall basis the percentage of organized workers is not keeping pace
with the growth in the size of the work force.

Through the shrinking

proportion of blue collar workers, automation appears to have a particu
larly severe effect on three sources of union power;

the exclusive ju

risdiction over a particular industry or occupation, the exclusive rep
resentation of the bargaining unit, and the potential use of the strike
weapon.^
It is not at all generally accepted that this reduction in the
relative size of organized labor is an unfavorable occurrence.
can keep the supply of workers low, the wages will be higher.

If unions
If more

people want to work than there are openings, the union will help decide
which are hired.

Unions and management are currently under a great deal

of pressure to correct the situation where this procedure was used as a
disguise for racial prejudice.

The union hiring hall and the closed

shop are devices used to hold down the supply of labor.

This will cause

the supply curve to intersect the demand curve at a higher point on the
ordinate axis resulting in higher pay for the fewer workers who are em
ployed.

Where increases in union membership have occurred,

...only TS1o of union membership increases has resulted from new
organizing. The remaining 1$% has come either from the return of
former members, who previously were unemployed, or from the expan
sion of employment in companies with a union-shop arrangement....
In 1953 almost 3Ü% of the nonagricultural employees belonged to
unions, whereas in 1966 only 28 % belonged,
Notwithstanding the shrinking percentage of union members in the work
force, more than 60 percent of all production and kindred workers in the
^Rezler, 0£. cit., p. l55.

^^Ibld., p. 121.
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manufacturing sector of the United States economy are employed in plants
in which the majority of workers are covered by collective bargaining
a g r e e m e n t s . ■32

In any case, the labor movement seems to be losing some

of its drive and fervor.

Some say that it is losing its raison d^ëtre.

One of the original purposes underlying union growth was the exist
ence of unsatisfactory social conditions in industry. Presently,
the social discontent of prior years has been alleviated, and with
its relief, one of the primary drives of the union movement has been
completed. For new organizing efforts, other reasons must be f o u n d . 33
iifith their membership roles relatively stagnant the union officials need
a method whereby they can guarantee a greater percentage of members in
those firms where they are already organized.

The most popular way, in

terras of usage, not appeal, of the union’s doing this is through the
union-shop contract.
The Union Shop — Pro and Con
The union shop agreements between a union and a firm requires a
worker who is not already a member of the union when he is hired to join
the union within a prescribed number of days after being hired.

If he

does not join the union prior to the end of the period of grace, which
is commonly one month, the non-member will lose his job.

Because the

union shop permits non-union workers to be hired initially, it is an
improvement over the closed shop which prohibited non-members from being
hired at all.

The closed shop was normally accompanied by a closed

union, so the non-member was effectively barred permanently from eraploy32Labor Research Association, Labor Fact Book - 17
International Publishers, 196$), p. 117.

(New York:

^%ax Sidones Wortman, Jr., (ed.). Critical Issues in Labor:
Text and Readings (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1969), p. 33.
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ment.

An improvement or not, the union shop is, nevertheless, compulsory

unionism.

In the eyes of many, anything compulsory is evil.

The argu

ments in favor of and against the union shop center around whether or
not this compulsion is justified, and whether or not it is legitimate.
The major argument for the union shop is that individual workers
should not be able to accept the benefits secured by their union
without helping to pay for the expenses involved. [However], it
is not clear that eveiy employee is better off when he is repre
sented by a u n i o n / 3B {Italics in the original)
Does this very legitimate goal provide adequate justification for the
compulsion to join a union?

In a labor contract "the standard union-

security provisions give the union a control over the citizen which no
society can allow to a private organization and which a free society
cannot even allow its government without stringent checks on its exer
cise. "33 The exercise of powers by a union
...must be exercised in a clearly defined process and by an auth
ority which is both duly qualified and disinterested.... If these
conditions are not met, the police powers of any private group be
come socially unbearable, no matter how vital it is for the group
to have them or how desirable for society that the group p r o s p e r . 36
Counterarguments are stated so as to avoid the basic issue of whether
compulsoiy unionism does or does not violate an individual’s democratic
rights.

This ethical and legal question remains unsettled.

...the union shop is desirable for the contribution it can make to
stable industrial relations. ...a union whose security is beyond
question can afford to be more reasonable on other matters — notably
promotions, layoffs, and other points at which discrimination might
be practiced against union members. A union which fears for its
life must necessarily try to restrict the employer at all these
points.37
^Bok and Dunlop, o£. cit., p. 99.
Order

3^Peter F. Drucker, The New Society; The Imatomy of Industrial
(Kew York; Harper and Row, ïtib'lishers, 1962), p. IZL.
36Ibid., p. 123.

■^Reynolds, o£. cit., p. 196.
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A union shop clause is simply one to protect the union.

The union which

is not under constant attack by the employer can channel its efforts
into more constructive areas.
...the Industrial union is primarily interested in workers after
they go on the payroll. Thus the typical union security of the
industrial union is the union shop. Union security is a condition
precedent to effective, independent employee representation. Once
union security is established, management’s major concern is pre
serving the right to manage.^ (Italics in the original)
Management argues that workers are coerced into belonging if
there is a union shop; that they must pay a third party for the priviledge to work.
union shop.

The evidence, however, shows that most workers favor a

In National Labor Relations Board balloting in over 20,000

elections, 98 percent of these favored a union shop and received over
95 percent of the votes cast.

Power struggle is the basis of struggle

between management and labor.

A union security provision in a collective

bargaining agreement entrenches the union’s position in the shop, it
strengthens it against attack by the employer or rival unions, and it
helps make the union permanent.

Management opposition recognizes these

facts; it fights a delaying action.

If a union can be occupied holding

its membership together, it will be in a less favorable position to press
fresh demands on the employer.

The question to be asked is whether or

not strong, stable, permanent unions are desirable for American industry.
A "yes" corresponds with support for the union shop; a "no" supports the
open shop,

"...a union is better able to function in a peaceful and

constructive way if it embraces most or all of the labor force.

It is

unreasonable to demand that unions be ’responsible’ while at the same
time denying union officers the control over their membership which
■3®Beal and Wickersham, op. cit., p. ?U5.
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would make group responsibility effective."39
The right-to-work law, as they are commonly called, is a state
law which prohibits the union shop agreement.

The Taft-Hartley Act

(supra) allows state or territorial laws to supercede the federal law,
in contrast ivith normal procedure.

The right-to-work laws have been the

most common counter to the union shop contract.

They are not, however,

without a great deal of controversy in their own right.

"Right-to-Work

laws provide protection so that the right of an individual to secure and
hold a job shall not be abridged by a union security agreement entered
into by an employer and the u n i o n . I n contrast to this extremely
critical view of the union shop, others believe that
...it is not possible for a union to exist without the union shop....
Under the Federal Labor-Kanagement Act, the authorized union must
represent all workers in the bargaining unit, must process all
grievances, must service all employees whether they are members or
not. Is it just, asks the union, for the organization to provide
all these services to persons who refuse to pay the fare?... The
union is obliged to speak for one and all not simply by law but by
the laws of its own being. The modern union can also argue that the
union shop is democratic, with majority rule in the shop community.
This, indeed, comes much closer to the concept of the union as the
worker government in the polis of the w o r k p l a c e .
(Italics in the original)
The principal argument in favor of right-to-work legislation is based on
the assertion that compulsory unionism is in violation of an individual’s
fundamental liberties guaranteed by Constitutional rights.
cific arguments include, but are not limited to;

These spe

comnulsory unionism is

an invasion of the right of freedom of association; compulsory unionism
-^%eynolds, o£. cit., p. 197.
^*^Merryle Stanley Rukeyser, Collective Bargaining: The Power
to Destroy; Mew and Better Ways to Industrial Peace (New ïork: Delàcorte Press, 19èB), p. 202.
^^Tyler, og. cit., p. 196.
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does not exist in most democratic states; the Declaration of Human
Rights of the United Rations supports the right of associations; com
pulsory unionism means paying tribute for a job and accepting opinions
of the union leaders; and it means giving up freedom of conscience.
arguments against right-to-work laws include;

The

majority rule is inherent

in democratic procedure; employees want compulsory unionism; since union
activities benefit everj’’ employee in the bargaining unit, all should pay;
other organizations compel membership, such as the bar association; com
pulsory unions make unions secure and allows discipline; unions giye
employees a voice; right-to-work is an invasion of freedom of contract;
right-to-work is just anti-union; and compulsory unionism promotes labor
peace.b2
The union shop is really a union's way of establishing itself as a
polity in the shop, with its political leaders, its defined policy,
its own police force. The union shop is the government that rises
on the foundation of recognition, seeking security for the worker as
an individual and for the union as a cornorate entity. The union
shop is the formalization of the union as a political c o r p o r a t i o n . ^3
If it is justified to make the analogj'- between the political government
of society and the union as the government of the work place, then it
seems reasonable to conclude that compulsory?- unionism is logical and
desirable.

If, on the contrary, the union is not to be viewed as the

government of the work place, then compulsory unionism is an unwarranted
restriction of personal liberties.
1. Public debate by the parties involved is designed to conceal the
real issue relating to right-to-work legislation. 2. If one de^^Raymond L. Hilgert and Jerry D. Young, "Right-to-Work Legis
lation — Examination of Related Issues and Effects,” Critical Issues in
Labor; Text and Cases, ed. Max Sidones Wortman, Jr. (New York; Macmillan and Company, Ï969), pp. 378-82.
^3py1er, op. cit., p. 199.
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fines right-to-work legislation as being necessary and able to pro
tect an individual's constitutional rights, then effective right-towork legislation would be justified and desirable. 3, Existing
right-to-work laws have had little effect either in economic terms
or in changing previous existing union-management relations in their
states of enactment. 1|. The real issue in the right-to-work battle
is collective bargaining power. $. Right-to-work legislation in
its present form may not be to the over-all advantage of management
forces, since it conceivably contributes to the exercise of militant
and perhaps undesirable union leadership.
The principal reason for the low level of effectiveness of rightto-work laws in overall economic terms is that none of the large, indus
trial states has enacted right-to-work legislation.

Those states in

which right-to-work legislation has been enacted were already strongly
anti-union.

Previously existing labor-managements were not greatly

effected because of efforts to circumvent the intent of the laws.
Employers who want good relations with their unions have usually
winked at the law (right-to-work), just as employers in traditional
closed shop industries have winked at Taft-Hartley. Where relations
are bad, however, and where the employer wants to mount a drive
against the union, an anti-union shop law may give him an additional
club ."12
Unless the right-to-work law is fully supported by management its effect
will be virtually zero.

The security of the union is enhanced by the

inclusion in collective bargaining agreements of union shop provisions.
Only if the union is safe from attack car. it afford to cooperate with
management and play a constructive role in the operation of the enter
prise.^^ The union feels that if a company fails to have a union shop
it wants to get rid of the union.

The union defends itself against

employer attack, real and imaginary.

It must have contract provisions

^^Hilgert and Young, loc. cit., pp. 385-86.
^^Reynolds, o£. cit., pp. 19U-95.
k^Ibid., p. 195.
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to prevent discrimination against union men; it limits his power to
select, promote, transfer, layoff, and discharge.
to justify its own existence.

It invents grievances

It gives good service to union members

and none to non-union members.

The union argues that employer acceptance

of the union shop would make all this unnecessary.

The union officials

could work on personal problems and production difficulties, giving
prompt attention to genuine grievances, performing educational functions,
and cooperating with management.

The central point in the arguments on

both sides of the questions of the union shop and right-to-work laws is
the role to be played by

the union.Iftheunion is desirable, then the

union shop can easily be

justified.Ifthe union is undesirable, then

the union shop should be

prohibited.
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CHAPTER n i
AGREEKENT ACCEPTANCE
Union Democracy
If the ■union is to be considered the government of the work
place, and since governments in the United States reflect the will of the
governed, then the union must, also, reflect the will of those whom it
"governs."

In this respect, political governments are democratic, just

as union governments should be.

Most unions are democratic in structure

in the sense that they are based on majority rule and are governed with
the consent of the governed.

They do, on the contrary, "lack many of the

forms, traditions, and practices of American government.

They rarely

have a clear separation of powers between legislature, executive, and
judicial,

(sic)"^?

On the national level in many unions the executive

council carrys out all three of these functions.

At the local level,

the shop steward performs different jobs which fall into the three
different categories.
There are three primary reasons for maintaining democracy in
union governments.

First, democracy permits members to exert pressure

on their leaders to pay attention to the rank and file. Secondly, many
employees value a sense of participation they derive from helping select
union officials and influencing important decisions.

Thirdly, the gen-

Tyler, o£. cit., p. 281.

2?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
eral public has a vested interest in the democratic process within
u n i o n s . A union leader is a spokesman and representative,

"His power

must rest on express delegation from those for whom he speaks.

He must

be able to claim that he has both right and power to make decisions for
them.

This he can only do if he is e l e c t e d , I n most cases, the

union officials are elected, from, the shop steward through the local
leader to the national or international president.

In some cases there

are questions and doubts concerning the circumstances under which these
elections are held.
The legalistic dimension of union democracy is the existence of pro
cedures for fair and regular elections, reasonable trial procedure
in applying union discipline, and guarantees that members of the
union have a right to express reasoned dissent from uni.on policy,
...the extent to which individual members of unions feel that they
are capable of influencing union policy, and their satisfaction with
the policies established.50
Many, and possibly most, people think of a union as a monolithic, oneparty structure.

The essential ingredient is that the individual worker

has some means of influencing the union policies.

This might be done

either through the leader in power or through the election of a new
leader.

With regard to his union the labor leader is an elected official,

dependent upon the loyalty of fellow leaders and upon the rank and file
of his organization.

The greatest organizing upsurge of the thirties

showed that officers who were not sufficiently responsive to the demands
of industrial workers could lose p o w e r , % e reason why the union
^®Bok and Dunlop, op, cit,, pp. 71-72,
b^Drucker, op, cit., p, 133.
^^Beal and Wickersham, 0£, cit., p. 60 .
Wright Mills, "The Labor Leaders and the Power Elite,"In
dustrial Conflict, ed, Arthur Komhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur M,
Ross (Nevj Yorkî McGraw-Hill Book Company, Incorporated, 195U), p. lU8 .
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official who has lost touch with his constituency ma.y be voted out of
office is that his actions are visible to the workers whom he represents.
Unlike a member of Congress whose actions there are not generally known
to his constituents, the paid union officer responsible for semricing a
shop is under constant review by the members and is judged by the results
of his actions.^2

As a result, the dissatisfied worker loiows whom to

blame for the situation which confronts him.
Workers have two methods of demonstrating dissatisfaction with their
union's performance at the bargaining table; by seeking to oust from
office those responsible for the negotiations, or by shifting their
support to a competing union so as to deprive the bargaining union
of its majority status.
As long as the individual worker has control over the union officials
through the election process, it is not ipso facto bad that union con
trol be centralized.
Centralized control of the union by a powerful leader and his machine
may thus work in the public interest — however much it goes counter
to the creed of democratic unionism. I'Jhlle centralized control may
enable the leader to be a 'labor statesman' it undermines the vigor
and health of unionism and may even threaten its survival.... The
greatest damage to the strength of the union — one endangering its
vei^’' survival — may well be the effect of centralized control on
the future supply of leaders.
Centralized control is detrimental to the supply of new leaders because
the incumbent is jealous of possible replacements and thus tends to
supres8 them.

The younger men may tire of waiting and move elsewhere.

When the "old man" does die, however, someone is always there to take
his place, and the union does not cease to function.

Both the United

Auto Workers and the Teamsters have recently had a change of top command
without any reduction in efficiency, and for that matter, vrith few
changes of policy.
^^Tyier, op. cit., p. 289.

^%ummers, loc. cit., p. 83 .

^^Drucker, o£. cit., pp. Iiil-ii2 .
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Ilinority Rights
One of the basic tenets of American democracy is that "majority
rules."

As a countervailing rule, the rights of the minority must not

be violated.

The majority will ultimately get its way, but it must not

unreasonably restrict the minority.
free to express itself.

Above all, the minority must be

In this way it might become the majority.

Majority rule may be necessary to prevent the minority from frus
trating the objectives of the majority. Majority rule may also be
upheld to prevent the minority from accepting the results of group
action xidthout helping to assume the burdens involved. Majority
rule may also be required to safeguard the interests of persons
outside the organization.55
What the authors allude to here is the union shop.

The majority makes

policy, and they might decide to force the minority to join the union to
force them to pay their share.

The controversy over the union shop is

not merely over minority rights but more importantly is over union
access to dollars through compulsory merabership.
In a voting context minority means those people who disagree
vdth the opinions of the majority.

In another context minority means

those people who are members of some particular identifiable group,
particularly anyone who is not white-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant.

The rights

of these minorities, too, must be respected by.the majority.

The prob

lem of minorities in labor unions is acute because of the heterogeneous
membership of unions and their binding power through bargaining that
they have over

m e m b e r s . 56

whom it represents.

The democratic union must serve all of those

The question is how to do so.

55sok and Dunlop, o£. cit., p. 9h,
55lbid., p. 93 .
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where interest groups are inflexible and built into the occupational
structure of the union (as they are in the vast majority of unions)
it would appear that [two-party] democratic processes not only lead
to oppression of the minority subgroups, but they probably lead to
more oppression than would rule by one man.??
(Italics in the original)
This is not to imply, however, that rule by one man is to be preferred.
Actually, two-party competition ’■jithin a union is so rare as to be in
significant.
garchies,

Most unions are run by one-party, self-perpetuating oli

They only have to be responsive to the opinions of the

workers.
Membership Voting
In order to have a democratic union there must be some method of
electing the officials.

At the shop level the elections for steward may

be little more than popularity contests.
deal primarily with issues.

At higher levels the elections

The union member either approves of the

present policies or believes others should be followed. All elections
are becoming votes of confidence or lack of confidence, and this is more
true of a union election than of one for public o f f i c e . A l l that can
be done is to "turn the rascals out."
The discharge of union functions cannot even be controlled by the
membership. All they can do is to throw out one particular set of
leaders — but only to put in another, equally uncontrollable one.
There is no way for a dissenting group to operate except by a cam
paign to turn out the incumbents. Union leadership may be compared
to a system of government which has an elected executive without
^?Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, Union
Democracy, The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union
(Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, 19^6), p. 300.
^®Lloyd H. Fisher and Grant McConnell, "Internal Conflict and
Labor-Union Solidarity," Industrial Conflict, ed. Arthur Kornhauser,
Robert Dubin, and Arthur M. Ross (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Incorporated, 19^U), p. Hi3.
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the control of an elected legislature or a judiciary. The only
course open for the members is to follow the leader altogether or to
repudiate him altogether.^9
If an individual wants a particular policy followed, his first
step is to inform his representative, whether he be public official or
union official.

If the official does not follow that policy, and the

individual feels strongly enough about the issue, his only recourse is
to vote for someone else and hope that that person will follow the de
sired course of action.

If such is not the case, the procedure must be

repeated.
Voting for officers, however, is not the only voting done by the
union member.

Although precise statistics are unavailable, the great

majority of collective bargaining agreements are negotiated subject to a
ratification vote by the membership.^

The subject of ratification of

collective bargaining agreements by the work force is covered in the
following section.
Ratification of Agreements
Negotiators for the union are seldom given final authority to
conclude an agreement in collective bargaining which td.ll bind the union.
In the union the authority flows upward; union negotiators must be dele
gated this authority specifically.^^ host commonly, the negotiator is
elected and given authority to negotiate an agreement, but he is denied
the authority to make the final decision on the agreement.
authority is reserved by the workers.

That

When the negotiator reaches an

agreement T-d,th the company representatives, he must then return to the
^^Drucker, op. cit., p. 132.

^®Bok and Dunlop, 0£. cit., p. 78.

^^Beal and Wickersham, o£. cit., p. 163.
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shop where the workers will vote on the contract as soon as a meeting
for that purpose can be convened.

All may vote on the contract which

the local negotiator brings back.

If the bargaining is on a nationwide

scale, the normal procedure is that each local must approve the contract
before they are bound by it.
The ratification problem grows out of the separation of the
authority to negotiate an agreement from the power to make it
binding. An apparent agreement made at the bargaining table can be
repudiated at the ballot box. Such separation of authority not only
complicates bargaining and adds a hurdle to concluding an agreement;
it also divides responsibility, giving room for deception, evasion
of responsibility, and misunderstanding.
Legally such separation of authority is not required, for ratifi
cation by membership vote is not required or even preferred by the
law. The union is legally required to follow the procedures pre
scribed in its constitution for making collective agreements, but
the choice of procedures is the union’s.
Alternative methods for approving agreements which will avoid or
reduce separation of the authority to negotiate and the power to
bind are available and familiar to unions. Some unions give those
who conduct negotiations the power to make an agreement final and
binding. The negotiators may be regularly elected union officers or
a negotiating committee specially elected for that purpose. Though
the negotiators may be politically answerable to the union members,
the agreement made at the bargaining table is b i n d i n g .
Some unions have special committees of elected representatives from
various locals to approve the agreements made by the negotiators who
are regularly elected members.

This frequently occurs where negotiators

have the power to bind the workers.
Ratification by direct vote of the membership is particularly domi
nant where the contract relates to a single locality, whether the
contract covers a single plant or a local employer's association....
Where approval is in form by a delegate body, there is often in fact
reliance on direct referendum; for delegates frequently take pro
posals back to their local membership, hold a referendum, and then
cast their votes accordingly.
Union practices reflect attitudes that seem to be deeply rooted and

^^Summers, loc. cit., p. 79.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
T>jidespread in the labor movement. Most union officers favor sub
mitting proposed contracts to membership votes, although there is
widespread recognition of the problems and pitfalls, and sometimes
an expression of bitterness because of repudiation by the member
ship, There is general agreement that ’voting by referendum' is
more satisfactory than any arrangement that would deprive the mem
bership of a direct vote, and that it is 'the only practical way of
making contracts that will endure.’
The attitudes of union officers seen to be substantially the same as
union members, both strongly favoring direct membership control. A
recent published study showed that nearly 90% of union officers and
members alike believed that the menbers should decide on the demands
to be made in bargaining, that the members should be kept fully in
formed of developments during negotiations, and that the members
should decide whether to accept or to reject the contract,
It is understandable that the union officers do not want to have final
binding authority, for many men shun responsibility and dislike having
to make decisions.

This situation fits them perfectly, for they can

just struggle along until finally a contract is approved by the member
ship; they need not worry about making a decision because the membership
makes it for them.

It is also understandable that the membership also

favors direct vote, for it is much easier to view the situation with
hindsight than it is to decide ahead of time what is desired and then
give the negotiators adequate instructions.

Most employers do not like

separation of negotiation and ratification.

It is a misconception of

the democratic process and is impractical for the bargaining process.
Some, however, think ratification is a good idea because it prevents
abuses and it develops a more competent leadership.

The procedure of

ratification may prevent abuses of power, for a lack of any power cer
tainly cannot be abused.

Ratification may not necessarily lead to

better leadership, for leaders who are inexperienced in decision making
m%r not be the best possible leaders.

The purposes of ratification are

^ ^ i d . , p. 87,
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are to increase the acceptability of an agreement and to provide some
method for participation by the work f o r c e . I f a contract is ratified
by the membership, it is, by definition, acceptable to the majority be
cause it was approved by them.

The reality of the danger that agreements

unpopular with the membership will lead to disruptive dissension within
a union and invite raids by rival unions is one of the reasons union
officers favor membership v o t e s . A s far as the employer is concerned,
acceptance by their employees means stable labor relations.

If the ne

gotiators have bound the workers in a contract they do not like, the
employer vri.ll find neither the productivity he was seeking nor the in
dustrial peace.

The negotiator, if he is to be given final approval

authority, must insure that the contract to which he agrees is in accor
dance with the desires of the majority of his constituency.
1. Membership ratification helps assure and secure the accept
ability of a collective agreement. The direct vote by the members
can give a more accurate measurement of acceptability than can
action by elected officials or delegates. 2. Rejection by refer
endum votes reveal troublesome problem areas in our collective bar
gaining institutions and structures. Rejection... demonstrates that
its leaders or negotiators have so lost touch with the members as to
miscalculate their desires, or have so failed to inform the members
as to invite misunderstanding. 3. Ratification by vote of the mem
bers need not significantly impede the bargaining process.... h.
Ratification procedures in a number of unions contain defects that
lead to unnecessary difficulties.oo
Although ratification is fraught with problems, in the past this pro
cedure has seemed easier to follow than to bother to go to the effort to
make a workable procedure that does not involve ratification.
An affirmative vote is a member's willingness to be bound; the
collective agreement becomes his, and he feels an obligation to uphold
it.

Even the negative vote has a willingness to obey based on support
6!*Ibid., p. 87.

p. 83.

66ibld., pp. 101-02.
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of majority v/ill.

If there is no ratification, and the member does not

feel that the contract reflects the will of the majority, then his duty
to obey may be replaced by a justification to r e b e l . I f the contract
does reflect majority will, however, the worker will feel the same moral
compulsion as if it had been ratified,

"...the meaningful function of

ratification is to test the acceptability of a proposed collective
agreement to those who are to be governed by its terms.Acceptability
is measured directly by a referendum vote; it is measured indirectly
when the negotiators are given prior instructions by the membership or
when an agreement is approved by delegates selected by the membership.
For a proposal to be acceptable, benefits must be distributed among em
ployee groups corresponding to the employees' own hierarchy of competing
claims; and total benefits obtained are acceptable as balanced against
costs risked by insisting on more.

The benefits must be divided in

accordance with the informal structure of the employee group, and doing
so is an exercise in group psychology.

The conduct of the negotiators

and the agreements they reach will be influenced by the presence of the
ratification process and the risk of rejection by the members.Their
actions are also shaped by the possibility of being voted out of office
by the membership at the next election and by instructions the member
ship gives them prior to the beginning of bargaining in the form of a
mandate.

In ratification a "vote is meaningful only if the accept

ability of an agreement is measured against the alternative of a strike."70
Unless the alternatives are clear-cut and meaningful, a referendum will

^7Ibid., p. 85.

^^Ibid., p. 82 .

^^Ibid,. p. 88 .

70lbid., p. 90.
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not be a reliable measure of acceptability.
There are many problems involved vxith the ratification of nego
tiated collective bargaining agreements by the workers.

If they are to

be given the power to decide whether an agreement reached at the bar
gaining table is to become a binding contract, then how shall the rati
fication process be constructed and administered to achieve its maximum
value with a minimum disruption and distortion of collective bargaining??^The value of ratification is that it is an absolutely positive indication
that the proposed contract is acceptable to a majority of the workers.
Collective bargaining is intended to be a negotiation among represen
tatives of labor and management to arrive at a mutually acceptable con
tract.

This intent is frustrated when the labor representatives do not

posess the power to agree to a proposal but only have the power to re
ject or propose alternatives.

In some cases during negotiations an

advisory vote of the membership is taken for the benefit of the nego
tiators, but this procedure runs the risk of a strike through miscal
culation,

Neither side knows when the other side is no longer vriLlling

to make further compromises.?^ A further problem is deciding who should
be permitted to vote on a contract proposal.

Those not directly involved

should be denied the vote, and only those employees who face the alter
natives of accepting the contract or going on strike should vote on the
agreement.?-3 Only a ratification vote given in the face of a strike is
a true indication of the acceptability of an agreement.

In such a vote

the members permitted to vote should be those in the striking unit, so
no one group holds a veto
?llbid., p. 81 .

p o w e r . ?b

The local union ratifies the col-

72ibid., p. 90.

?%)ld., p. 91.

?%bid.. p. 92 .
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lective bargaining agreement as a whole.
They cannot ratify ^arts of it and reject other parts. If any part
of the agreement is so objectionable to the members that they will
not swallow it, the whole agreement fails and the negotiators have
to go back and tty again. Their job is not complete until the whole
of their work has met vd.th membership a p p r o v a l . ' ?
By having separate votes on contract and strike the union is dodging the
alternatives, although the practice is common.

There are normally many

more votes against the agreement than in favor of a strike alternative.
The members are saying that they do not like the proposal, but they do
not want to go on strike about it.

The negotiators have no alternative,

since the members refused to strike, but to accept the agreement dis
approved by the members.
but disown responsibility.

Thus the members can express dissatisfaction
"The democratic process fails both to vali

date the agreement and to create any commitment by the members to be
bound.

The solution is self-evident:

make explicit on the ballot and

otherwise that voting against the contract is equivalent to voting for a
s t r i k e . A s noted previously, however, the system of voting afterthe-fact is not the only possible democratic procedure for obtaining
member acceptance of collective bargaining agreements.
A fundamental question is whether union members are able to make
an intelligent and responsible evaluation of a proposed bargain.?? The
issues in collective bargaining have become increasingly complex and
require knowledge of technological developments and economic conditions
of the industry.

However, rejections have occurred where members were

not infoimied; if issues are complicated, members tend to rely heavily on
yd
'^Beal and Wickersham, op. cit., p. 19L.
76oumners, loc. cit., p. 91.

77Ibid^, p. 98.
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recommendations of leaders.

Some people fear that union members vrill

insist on unrealistic demands; however, studies of rejection show that
when members vote down a contract endorsed by their negotiators, it is
not because the package is not big enough, but because it lacks (or con
tains) certain things, or because it was not distributed equitably,
It may also fail because a secret ballot is not used, and the workers
are swayed by fear of co-worker disapproval if they fail to vote the way
the others vote. Members are usually less agressive than international
representatives and will settle for less because th%r have more to lose.
There is a fear that members will rigidly resist automation or
other technological changes that threaten job security; Those affected
are usually in a minority, and the remainder are not willing to sacri
fice for their fellow workers; they measure a contract on what it means
to them personally.

Although rejection does not occur frequently, such

rank-and-file rejections of proposed contract settlements are destructive
to collective bargaining.

"It is a backward step to replace negotiation

by competent and informed men m t h emotionalism and mob rule."^^

The

union membership as a whole is certainly less qualified to evaluate a
contract proposal than the negotiators themselves, and the intended
purpose of ratification of collective bargaining agreements by the union
membership, that of acceptability, may be obtained in other ways.
Settlement Rejection
The rejection of a proposed contract negotiated through col
lective bargaining represents a breakdown in the system.
78lbld.

Although such

^^Rukeyser, o£. cit., p. 81 .
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rejections occur T-rf.th only moderate frequency, the fact that they do
occur at all is a procedural failure that may be avoided.

In 1961 the

big Kenosha, Wisconsin, local of the United Auto Workers rejected the
profit-sharing agreement worked out by the managers of American Motors
Corporation and UAW lead ers .Al so in 1961 the members of the New York
Philharmonic Orchestra went on strike when presented by their local
officers with a signed agreement.

They complained that they had not

participated in the negotiations.®^

In 196ij., longshoremen in New York

had a six months negotiation, a strike, an 8o day Taft-Hartley "coolingoff" period, and a rejection of the employers' last offer, an agreement
reached which was described by union officers as "the best contract ever
won in the history of the union."

Two daj’'s after negotiators agreed on

the contract the membership voted 89o8 to 7561 against, even though
their leaders strongly urged ratification.
all Atlantic and Gulf ports.
ment.

This triggered a strike at

A revote in New York approved the settle

After a campaign to educate the members, the contract was approved

in New York.

The Baltimore and Miami locals both initially rejected

their settlements.

Baltimore approved theirs after a minor modification,

and Miami did likewise after the local union president reversed his
stand.®2
In 1963 the New York Typographers rejected an intricately negotiated
agreement and continued their lOG-day strike another two weeks. An
insurgent faction of the union president's 'hard-line party' derided
the economic benefits as too niggardly and the protective clauses as
too weak.®3
In I96U the Chicago taxicab drivers rejected a settlement which the
mayor and federal conciliators had presented to employer and union
®^Chamberlain, o£. cit.. p. 196.

®^Ibid., pp. 195-96.

®^Summers, loc. cit., pp. 75-77.

®%hamerlain, o£. cit., p. 195,
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leaders.

In 1966 the airlina mechanics rejected a contract which the

President of the United States had helped negotiate* they accepted a
second contract containing substantially increased benefits.®^

Inasmuch

as rejection of proposed agreements do occur, it is necessary to examine
the reasons for rejection.
Failure of downward communication from union officials to union
members is usually a failure to realize that an agreement must be ex
plained to the members or that it be explained adequately.

Not only

must the members have the contract explained to them, they must be con
vinced that they should ratify it.

The negative vote in the 1965 New

York longshoremen settlement was due to
...misunderstanding and to a lack of full information on the part of
the union members. -The reduction in work gangs created a fear for
loss of jobs; there was no full understanding of the 1600 hour guar
antee; and the provision giving employers 'flexibility* in assigning
workers was distrusted because the members had not been told the
narrow interpretation agreed upon in negotiations.... Analysis of
the vote showed that at those piers where the contract was fully
explained, the workers voted to accept it, but that where it was not
fully explained, it was voted down. ^
Only after the contract was fully explained were the members willing to
accept their leaders' judgement and vote to accept the contract.
...the most common cause of rejection is that the communications
structure within a union has failed to function. Breakdown may be in
the communications upward from the members to the negotiators, that
is, the negotiators fail to understand the members' system of pri
orities, ...on the other hand, the breakdown may be in the communi
cation downward from the negotiators to the members ; the negotiators
fail adequately to inform the members of the terms of an agreement
and of the considerations that make it acceptable.
Just as failure adequately to explain the contract to the workers and to
convince them to accept the contract may lead to rejection, so also will
^^Summers, loc. cit., p. 77.

^^Ibid., p. 76 .

^^Ibid.. pp. 92-93.
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failure of the members to transmit clearly their beliefs and desires to
their representatives result in a proposed contract which is unaccept
able and that is subsequently not ratified.
Failure of communications either upward or downward, however,
is not the only reason for rejection of proposed collective bargaining
agreements.

The frequent rejection by the membership of contract set

tlements recommended for acceptance by the leadership in the last sev
eral years has been influenced in some way by the psychological attitude
of the members that due to the Landrum-Griffin Act they may speak up
freely and challenge leadership authority
Many cases of membership rejections are the result of the negotia
tors' failure to take a firm stand in support of an agreement. Host
members are willing to give great weight to recommendations of nego
tiators, but if those recommendations are halfhearted or the nego
tiators 'ride the fence,' a vacuum is created into which the oppo
sition can move and assert l e a d e r s h i p . ^8
In addition, younger members are becoming more numerous; they did not
work during the Depression.

Thus, they have little patience with tra

ditional collective bargaining methods and an almost total lack of iden
tification with the employer's interests.

The ratification process is

no longer a rubber stamp by the members after an agreement is reached
with designated union officials.^9
where employee restraining pressures are strong enough, a union can
not make the concessions necessary to reach agreement. Not only is
a settlement agreed upon in the face of employee opposition likely
to be rejected in an employee ratification vote, but the union nego^^Rukeyser, o£. cit., p. 79.
^^Summers, loc. cit., p. 96.
Vincent R. D'Alessandro, "Labor Relations in a Critical Area,"
Dealing vrith a Union, ed. LeRoy Marceau (American Management Association, 1969), p. 12.
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tiators reaching such an agreement may be voted out of office.90
Under some circumstances rejection may be intentional and desired by the
union leadership.
1. The union negotiators may pretend at the bargaining table to
agree but then... urge rejection in order to justify added demands.
Submission is but a bargaining ploy; and the negative vote is part
of a planned maneuver.
2. The union negotiators may reject the employer's proposals, but
consent to submit them to the membership, often at the employer's
insistance. Submission is an attempt to byp;ass the union leader
ship, and a negative vote is not a repudiation but an expression of
confidence in the negotiators.
3. The union negotiators may submit a tentative agreement to vote
without any strong recommendation for acceptance or rejection in
order to sound out the membership, k negative vote is neither a
repudiation nor an expression of confidence but instructions to the
negotiators to try for more.91
The purr.-ose of ratification of a proposed collective bargaining contract
is to test its acceptability, but this is often obscured by the system
used.

The next question to be appropriately asked is with what frequency

do rejections of negotiated collective bargaining agreements occur.
The local membership has failed to ratify an increasing number of
collective bargaining agreements negotiated by national officers.^2

One

study determined that about ten percent of the proposed settlements have
been rejected by the rank and file membership.93 This figure agrees
with that of another study which found that in 90 percent of the cases
the union members follow the lead of their negotiators.These surveys
agree under the assumption that the negotiators want to have the pacts
ratified.

It excludes the devious tactics of intentionally desiring

90
Kenneth Roberts, "The Bargaining Impasse," Dealing with a Union,
ed. LeRoy Marceau (American Management Association, 1909), p. 1^3.
9^Summers, loc. cit., p. 78.
^%ukeyser, op. cit., p. 78.

o^. cit., p. 137.
^^Summers, loc. cit., p. 88.
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rejection for bargaining purposes.

Summers also states that there are

no exact figures on how often the membership has voted do>m a contract
proposal.

Estimates of the frequency of occurrence vary widely, some

where between five and thirty percent.

The belief is commonly held

among both union and employer spokesmen that the number is substantial
and that it has increased markedly in recent years.

He also notes,

however, that rejections "do not all have the same significance, for a
negative vote by union members does not always signify repudiation of
the union negotiators.

Contracts nay be submitted to membership vote

for purposes and >rith expectations other than gaining approval of the
membe r s . W h e t h e r or not the particular rejection involves repudi
ation of the union leadership, it always upsets the collective bar
gaining process and normally results in a work stoppage or an extension
of one.
In recent years rejection of negotiated agreements has ceased to be
uncommon. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service estimates
that in over 7$0 situations in 1962, rank-and-file union members
rejected settlements negotiated and approved by their leaders.
Contract rejection continues to be a problem.
Of the 7,500 contracts federal mediators handled between mid-1965
and mid-1966, ten percent were vetoed by the members after their
leaders agreed on the terms; the figure has apparently never been
higher.97
In 1966 the rejection figure was close to twelve pe r c e n t . T h e per
centage of rejections continues to be high.

In 1970 the Chicago local

of the Teamsters Union rejected the pact that had been negotiated by the
9$Ibid., p. 78 .

96]gg^p and Wickersham, o£. cit., p. 19a.

97
Rukeyser, o£. cit., p. 76 .
Joseph Shister, "The Direction of Unionism, 19^7-1967 : Thrust
or Drift?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XX, no. U (July, 196?),
p. 579.
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national officers; the proposal subsequently agreed to was much more
lucrative.
In this chapter it has been shown that American unions are demo
cratic in that the members elect their leaders and that majority rules.
If the members become dissatisfied with the leaders, they may attempt to
convince the leaders to change their ways, they may elect new leaders of
the same union at the next election, they can hold a new certifying
election and change unions, or they can decide to have no union at all.
The members are well aware of what the leader is doing because the latter
is under constant scrutiny. The rights of the majority must necessarily
trandscend those of the minority as long as the latter's rights are not
violated with prejudice and as long as they may voice their dissatis
faction with the actions of the majority.

The most important such vio

lation occurs when the majority votes for a union shop and thereby forces
the dissenting minority to join the union against their will or lose
their jobs.
In addition, it has been noted that those union officials who
negotiate collective bargaining agreements are either regularly elected
officials or are specially elected for that purpose.

They are sent to

the bargaining table to meet with the representatives of management, but
they normally do not have the authority to bind the union to any contract
that is agreed upon.

That power, instead, is reserved by the workers.

After the union and management representatives agree to a contract, it
is taken back to the plant where the workers vote for or against ratifi
cation.

This separation of authority is not required by law, is detri

mental to the bargaining process, leads to work stoppages, and is not
based upon the democratic processes followed by the federal, state, or
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local governments.

An analysis of the problems involved with contract

ratification and their relationship ^fith the union shop follows in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLBÎS
The union claims to be the government of the work place.

It is

undoubtedly more valid for the union to make this claim than for any
other group to do so.

The union provides many governmental type ser

vices for its members.

It also generally provides them for the non

union members who belong to the bargaining unit.
these services are well worth their cost.

Some people feel that

Others believe that the ser

vices are not worth what they cost, that the member is not getting his
money's worth.

These costs are borne by the union member, by the firm,

and by the society.

Whether or not these costs are justified by the

services which unions perform is a purely judgemental matter and is
beyond the scope of this paper.

Nonetheless, unions, where they are

present, do function as the government of the work place.
The workers choose which union will be the one which will serve
as their government.

Unlike public office, however, they have the addi

tional option of voting not to have any union at all. When employees
decide not to have any union represent them, then collective bargaining
will not take place.

Instead, employees will deal with the employer on

an individual basis.

For this reason, the case where the employees opt

for no union is also beyond the scope of this paper.
This paper has examined what happens to the collective bargaining
procedure if the employees choose to organize and have decided upon
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their union and their individual representatives,

.lihich union they

choose as their bargaining agent and which individuals they choose as
representatives are immaterial.

The only concern is that they have

chosen a bargaining agent.
Having been chosen as the bargaining agent in a certification
election, the union is then authorized to enter into collective bar
gaining negotiations with representatives of the firm.

Those aspects

of collective bargaining other than the negotiation of a labor-management
contract have not been analysed.

When entering into contract negotiations,

each side is "armed" with lists of demands which it wants to be included
in the final contract.

Each item on the list is assigned a priority

indicating how strongly that side wants it and how readily they will
abandon it when pressed by the other side.

The process of negotiation

can be called give-and-take, "horse-trading," and compromise.

For each

side it involves giving up demands for their lower-priority items in
return for acceptance of their higher-priority items.

The individual

demands may change as the high-priority demands of the two sides are in
direct competition.

The agreement that is finally produced is the result

of a series of compromises.

The threat of a strike or the continuation

of one has a strong influence on the negotiations.

Which side is hurried

more depends upon their relative economic strength.
The proposed contract, agreed upon by the representatives of the
firm and the union, is a rational product.

The representatives of both

sides are aware of the economic condition of the firm, of the industry,
and of the economj%

These facts determine whether or not a particular

demand of the union is economically feasible.

The company cannot rea

sonably be expected to agree to proposals which it cannot afford.
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will be, naturally, disagreement over how much the company can afford to
include in the contract.

The compromise agreement on this issue must be

made with a full knowledge of the relevant economic conditions.
The normal procedure, followed by the vast majority of American
unions, is for the union to submit the proposed contract to its member
ship for ratification.

The primary purpose of the use of ratification

is to insure that the proposed contract is acceptable to the majority of
the union members.

In addition, ratification may provide them with a

sense of participation in the decision making process.

From time to

time both the union and management negotiators may use ratification as a
bargaining tool.

This purpose would be secondary, at best.

If the membership approves the proposed contract, then both the
union and the fiim will be bound by its conditions for a specified period
of time.

If the membership disapproves the proposed contract, then the

most likely result is a strike.

Under any circumstances a work stoppage

involves monetary loss for the firm in income, the union in strike pay
ments, and the individual workers in pay.

A work stoppage as a result

of failure to ratify a proposed contract means unnecessary loss.

The

loss is unnecessary because it would have been avoided if the contract
had been acceptable to the membership.

If the union negotiators are

given the power to bind the union to the contract agreed upon by both
them and the management representatives, the procedure of submitting the
contract to a vote of the members will not be followed.

By eliminating

this step, there will be no strikes over failure to ratify the contract.
To be sure, the workers can stage a wildcat strike, but such stoppages
not sanctioned by the union are infrequent occurrences; and the workers
are not able to remain on strike as long as they can during a sanctioned
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strike.

As such, the wild-cat strike is not a significant factor.

Elimination of the ratification of collective bargaining agreements
would result in fewer work stoppages.

How would this course of action

affect the basic purposes of ratification, acceptability of the contract
to the workers and their participation in the decision-making?
The submission of collective bargaining agreements to the workers
for ratification is not the only, nor is it necessarily the best, way of
achieving the goals of contract acceptability and decision-making parti
cipation by the work force.

Participation in the decision-making process

is, perhaps, a cornerstone to insuring contract acceptability and should,
therefore, be examined first,

when ratification is employed, the parti

cipation of the membership consists of approving or disapproving a pro
posed contract.

The union negotiators form a contract which is a com

promise between their interpretation of the desires of the workers and
the concessions of the management.
be accurate.

This interpretation may or may not

In addition, worker participation under ratification is

limited to an after-the-fact decision; they must either accept or re
ject the entire proposal.

There is no opportunity for them to vote

"yes" on parts of the contract and "no" on others.

Moreover, if the

membership does reject the proposal, there are no formalized methods of
informing the union negotiators just what portions of the contract were
unacceptable and what alternatives they would prefer.

Instead, the

negotiators must return to the bargaining table and try changing the
proposed contract to make it "better" and "acceptable," as the union
membership view it.
It would be far better for the membership to participate before
and during the negotiations rather than only after they are concluded.
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Prior to the beginning of negotiations, the union membership could in
dicate to their leadership the provisions they would like to have in
cluded in the contract and the priority attached to each.

During the

negotiations the union representatives could report the progress to
their constituency.

The membership could alter the priorities of their

desires, as necessary, and transmit this information to the negotiators.
Participation by the union membership before and during the conduct of
the negotiations is participation in its fullest sense,
Eîy establishing procedures for full and meaningful participation
by union members in the negotiation process, the cornerstone is laid for
insuring contract acceptability.

If the membership keeps the negotiators

informed of their desires and priorities, the latter id.ll be able to use
these continually in the shaping of the union’s demands.

Conversely, if

the negotiators constantly keep their constituency informed of the prog
ress of the negotiations, the latter idll be aware of whether or not a
given provision has a chance of being accepted by the firm; and they can
adjust their expectations accordingly.

This procedure may be difficult

to implement in the giant locals such as the HAW, but it could be done
idth few problems in the normal union.

As long as the expectations of

the members corresponds to the reality of the negotiating situation,
the contract which emerges from the negotiations will necessarily meet
with the complete acceptance of the members.

When the union membership

has participated fully in the collective bargaining process and the
resulting contract is acceptable to them, there is no need to ratify
that contract.
It may be argued that the lack of a ratification step in the
collective bargaining process may inhibit the union agent during nego-
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tiatioîi by giving him less flexibility, and that as a result he may fail
to agree to a proposal if he feels that the members did not want him to
go that far.

At the present time the union representative can use the

ratification vote as a negotiating tool.

He can shift responsibility,

on the surface, from himself to the membership.

He can pretend to agree

to an obviously unacceptable contract and submit it to ratification
knowing that it will be rejected.

When it is rejected, he can point an

accusing finger at the membership of the union while at the same time
claim to be innocent of any guilt.

He is guilty, however, of unnecessar

ily extending the total time required to reach a final collective bar
gaining agreement.
page.

He is also responsible for any resulting work stop

To the extent that the union agent would no longer be able to use

contract ratification as a tool of negotiation, the lack of that step in
collective bargaining would give him less flexibility. He would, there
fore, be forced to refuse to agree to proposed contract provisions which
he knows would be unacceptable to the union membership.
shouldering the responsibility himself.

He would be

He would, however, possess full

and up to date knowledge of the expectations of the membership which were
shaped by the information he provided them concerning the conduct of the
negotiations.

This open exchange of information between representative

and constituency would not only influence their actions and expectations,
but it would also influence the actions and expectations of the manage
ment representatives.

With the negotiators of both sides aware of the

aspirations of the membership, and knowing that an informed membership
is taking a realistic view of what is feasible, a compromise agreement
including the essential requirements of each side and conforming to the
expectations of the union membership can be reached without undue dif-
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ficulty.
Elimination of the ratification of proposed contracts may have
other practical effects on the negotiation process, each of which must
be evaluated.
changed?

First, would the length of the negotiation process be

At present, the negotiation period should be measured not by

the time it takes the negotiating teams to reach agreement but by the
time it takes for the proposed contract to be accepted by the member
ship through ratification.

Without ratification it would take longer

for the two sides to reach agreement than it does with ratification,
but the contract agreed upon would be final at that point.

When com

paring the times required to reach a final agreement with and without
ratification, there should be no significant difference; for the tine
required for membership ratification of the proposal would amount to
the difference.
Secondly, would the union agent be more reluctant to make de
cisions without ratification than he is with it?

Under neither set of

circumstances does the union representative want to make an unpopular
decision, for it is his success at the bargaining table that is the
principal means used by the membership for measuring his efficiency.
The unpopular agent will find himself voted out of office at the next
election.

With ratification, unpopularity is determined by the ratifi

cation or rejection of the proposed contract.

Without ratification, un

popularity would be immediately apparent to the negotiator through the
two-way communications that are present during negotiations.

Because he

is cognizant of the aspirations and expectations of the union membership,
and because he has helped to shape them by providing the members with
the progress of the negotiations, the union agent should be willing to
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make the decisions for the union and its members during collective bar
gaining.

Me will be confident that his decision will be the proper one

in that it will be based on his knowledge of the economic conditions of
the firm, the industry'', and the economy.

It will also be proper in that

it will be acceptable to the membership who have participated in the
decision making process through open, two-way communications.
Thirdly, would the business agent be more secure without ratifi
cation than he is with it?

Inasmuch as the ratings of union leaders are

a reflection of their success at the bargaining table, their security is
linked to the negotiations they conduct.

If, %d.th ratification, the

agent submits to the membership proposals which are consistently rejec
ted because he has lost contact with his constituency, he will find hi.s
tenure extremely short.

His security will be directly proportional to

the acceptability to the membership of the collective bargaining agree
ment which he negotiates.

Similarly, without ratification the security

of the business agent will be proportional to his success in negotiations.
Because in this case, however, ratification has been replaced by adequate
communications between the membership and their representative, the
latter will be able to conduct successful negotiations by making contract
proposals which are acceptable to the former, due to membership partici
pation in the negotiation process.
The replacement of contract ratification by the membership with
open communications between the business agent and his constituency
would be an improvement over ratification for several reasons.

First,

the number of strikes over failure to accept a collective bargaining
agreement through ratification would be greatly reduced.

Secondly, the

members' informing their representative of their desires and priorities
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and his informing them of the conduct of the negotiations would consti
tute full and meaningful participation by the workers in the decision
making process.

Thirdly, this participation would insure complete

acceptability of the contract to the membership because it would corre
spond vîith their expectations of what the contract should contain.
Lastly, labor-management relations would improve due to the effect on
the union shop.
At present one of the many sources of irritation between the
union and management is the former’s demand for the union shop.

The

situation is complex, involving the federal Taft-Hartley Act, various
state ”right-to-work" laws, and various management and union practices.
The principal arguments for and against the union shop have been pre
viously discussed.

Suffice it to say that any change which would the

friction between the firm and the union would be an improvement.
Under present practice a].l members of the bargaining unit are
permitted to participate in union certification elections.
cludes

both union and non-union members.

This in

Inasmuch as the non-union

memberdid not join the union which was certified,

it is reasonable to

assume that he voted against any union and, therefore, did not have any
real voice in choosing which union would be the bargaining agent.

Nor

may he choose which individuals will serve as his representatives, since
these men are union officers.

The non-union worker, however, is still

considered to be a member of the bargaining unit.
Without ratification of collective bargainingagreements the
union representatives will have complete authority to bind the workers
to a contract.

The members of the bargaining unit id.ll have no recourse.

This means that without ratification the non-union worker will have no
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say whatsoever in the bargaining agreement.

He will, therefore, be

highly motivated to join the union that is the exclusive bargaining
agent in order to obtain some voice in the bargaining process.

If the

workers all want to belong to the union of their own volition, the union
trill no longer be forced to press the management on this issue, thus
improving labor-management relations.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The ratification of collective bargaining agreements by the
workers is common practice in .American industry.

This procedure results

in miscalculation by the union representative of the desires and priori
ties of the workers.

This miscalculation results in proposed contracts

which are unacceptable to the workers who reject them at the ratification
vote.

A ratification vote is either synonymous with or accompanied by a

strike vote.

Contract rejection, therefore, normally means that the

workers go on strike or continue the existing one.

The elimination of

the ratification step in the bargaining process would be a procedural
improvement.
Whereas contract ratification is an after-the-fact approval and
rejection is an after-the-fact disapproval of the proposed contract, the
substitution of upward and downward communications between the union mem
bers and their officers allows involvement of the work force before the
final agreement is made.

Prior to the onening of the bargaining sessions,

the union membership could be polled by their officers.

The "ballot”

could contain the various proposed provisions which the union officials
feel are desirable.

The membership could be asked to add any additional

provisions which they would like and to list all the provisions in order
of priority.

The union negotiator could then take this information with

him to the bargaining table.

As negotiations progressed, he could keep
$9
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the workers informed of what provisions had been agreed upon and what
ones had no chance of adoption.

The membership could then advise their

representatives of any changes in their priority of desired provisions.
The recommended procedural change would mean that the union mem
bers would participate in the union’s decision making process to a mean
ingful degree.

The change would also mean that contracts negotiated

through collective bargaining would be acceptable to the work force.

It

would not involve any reduction in the flexibility of the union agents;
on the contrary, they would be better able to represent the interests of
their constituents.

The length of time taken to conduct negotiations

should not be changed, for the added time during negotiations to reach
agreement would be saved by not having a ratification vote and possibly
more negotiations.

The agent would be no more reluctant to make de

cisions at the bargaining table because he would be confident in his
knowledge of the attitudes of the members.

He would be secure in his

position because agreements acceptable to the membership means security
for the union representatives.

Elimination of ratification would result

in more workers joining the union in order to gain a voice in the nego
tiations.

This would allow the union to stop pressing the management

for a union shop, thus relieving some of the tension in labor-management
relations.
A union cannot expect to behave responsibly as long as it fears for
its existence and survival. It cannot assume responsibility for
wage policy. It cannot accept restraints on the use of the strike
weapon. Above all, it cannot assume responsibility for the survival
and profitability of the enterprise, cannot acknowledge management’s
authority as legitimate and necessary, and cannot enforce the con
tract upon its members, without the feeling of security the union
is bound to be disruptive to society and to the enterprise alike.99
°9brucker, o£. cit., pp. 122-23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

With the elimination of the hinderance of ratification to collective
bargaining and the resulting change in the desire of workers to join
the union, unions will be more secure, and thus more.responsible, to
the mutual benefit of the worker, the firm, and society.
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